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The role of social identity processes in mass emergency behaviour: An 
integrative review  
ABSTRACT 
This review provides an overview and new integration of recent research that has formed the 
basis of a social identity explanation of supportive collective behaviour among survivors in 
emergencies and disasters. I describe a model in which a sense of common fate in the 
emergency or disaster is the source of an emergent shared social identity among survivors, 
which in turn provides the motivation to give social support to others affected. In addition, by 
drawing on the concept of relational transformation in psychological crowds, I show how an 
emergent shared social identity can engender a range of further behavioural and cognitive 
consequences that contribute to collective self-organisation in emergencies, including 
increases in expected support, coordination of behaviour, and collective efficacy. It will be 
argued that the model can been applied to explaining how potentially dangerous crowd events 
avoid disaster: shared social identity operates as the basis of spontaneous self-organisation in 
these cases, as in many emergencies and disasters. 
Key words: Emergencies, disasters, social identity, social support, common fate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Studies of the evacuation of the World Trade Center towers on 9/11 illustrate a number of 
features common to emergencies and disasters. First, those evacuating the building mostly 
cooperated and attempted to provide each other with social support (Averill et al., 2005; 
Gershon, Magda, Riley, & Sherman, 2012; Proulx & Fahy, 2003) – sometimes involving a 
risk to personal safety. Second, despite moments of hesitation and disagreement, these 
evacuees typically behaved “as one”; the evacuation was characterised by self-organisation 
and coordination (Connell, 2001). Third, this cooperative and self-organised collective 
behaviour occurred even when there was no common group membership prior to the 
emergency (Solnit, 2009).  
Mass emergencies like 9/11 are defined by the following: first, there is a threat of death 
(whether real or perceived); second, this threat affects a large number of people at once; and 
third, there is a limited opportunity to escape to safety (Quarantelli, 2001). For present 
purposes, a disaster shares the first two criteria, but is characterised by limited access to 
resources, not limited opportunity to escape. Collective responses to these kinds of events are 
often described as “panic” (Fahy, Proulx, & Aiman, 2012; Sheppard, Rubin, Wardman, & 
Wessley, 2006), implying uncontrolled and selfish behaviour. It is true that some emergency 
evacuations are characterised by individualistic behaviour and hence lack of coordination 
(Chertkoff & Kushigian, 1999; Frey, Savage, & Torgler, 2010; Muir, Bottomley, & Marrison, 
1996). In addition, rather than people coming together as one, in some disasters social 
cleavages remain or become sharpened (Kaniasty & Norris, 1999). Furthermore, the level of 
collective support found in emergencies and disasters varies between events (Mawson, 2007), 
and within the same event, both over time and between individuals (Drury, Reicher, & 
Cocking, 2009a). However, given that in much of everyday life, particularly in Western and 
neoliberal societies, people are overwhelmingly positioned as individuals acting on the basis 
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of personal self-interest (Fairclough, 2013; Wagner, 1995), the repeated finding that people, 
in fact, act collectively in events where personal self-interest is threatened requires 
explanation.  
This relative prevalence of collective behaviour (and specifically social support) in 
emergencies and disasters, but also the fact that there is some variability in the extent of that 
collective behaviour, together suggest the relevance of the social identity approach as an 
explanatory framework, because this approach specifies the contextual conditions in which 
people act as members of groups. In this review article, I will provide an overview and 
integration of recent research that has served to develop a social identity model of collective 
behaviour in emergencies and disasters. Specifically, following self-categorisation theory 
(Turner, 1982, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, 
Haslam, & McGarty, 1994), I will argue that collective behaviour is possible in ad hoc 
crowds in an emergency or disaster through participants sharing an (emergent) social identity 
in the event. I will suggest that this shared social identity is also the basis of the motivation to 
support others affected by the emergency, and that the source of shared identity in these 
situations is the comparative context – specifically the common fate experienced by 
survivors. In this account, variability in the level of collective behaviour across different 
emergencies and disasters can be (partly) explained by variation in the level of shared social 
identification. 
In addition to these basic group processes, I will suggest other mechanisms that follow, 
directly and indirectly, from shared social identity in emergencies and disasters. Importantly, 
as well as the motivation to provide support, shared identity leads people to expect support 
from others who share their social category membership, as well as to trust these others to 
behave in the collective interest. Expected support is a crucial hinge for a variety of 
behavioural and psychological outcomes. As well as these predicted direct and indirect 
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effects of shared identity, the behaviour of relevant others can be a powerful (unintended) 
influence; when people with whom we share social identity express fear, or flee, or support 
others, this is likely to affect whether we do the same.  
After first specifying the scope and object of investigation, I will briefly review the 
major theoretical explanations for collective behaviour in emergencies and disasters. The 
research evidence for and against these different explanations will be used to suggest some of 
the principles that make up the social identity model I lay out in the following section. I will 
then describe experimental and field studies carried out by myself and colleagues that 
supports this social identity model. Next, I draw upon Reicher’s concept of relational 
transformation in psychological crowds (Neville & Reicher, 2011; Reicher, 2011) to derive 
some mediating processes and further outcomes in the social identity model (i.e., expected 
support, trust, coordination of behaviour, efficacy, safety perceptions). I then describe how 
the social identity approach explains how unintended influence operates in crowds during 
emergencies. Before outlining the limitations of this programme of work and some possible 
future directions, I will show how the social identity model has been applied to explaining 
how disaster is sometimes avoided in potentially dangerous crowd events.  
Defining the scope: What needs to be explained? 
There is a substantial research literature on, and a number of theoretical explanations for, 
bystander (non-)intervention (e.g., Darley & Latané, 1968; Latané & Darley, 1970; Piliavin, 
Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981; see Levine & Manning, 2013). While some of the 
principles and concepts established in this body of work can be carried over to explain the 
phenomena of interest in the present review, there are key differences. Most importantly, the 
literature on bystander helping and emergency intervention focuses on those situations where 
the person helping is not him- or herself in danger or need. This is different from a mass 
emergency, in which both helper and helped are (potential) victims. Helping behaviour within 
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a mass emergency, by contrast to typical bystander interventions, means a potential cost or 
risk to the helper as well as the helped.  
There is also a literature, both psychological and sociological, on “convergence” 
behaviour at disasters (e.g., Fritz & Williams, 1957; see also Solnit, 2009). This is the 
phenomenon whereby people unaffected by the disaster descend on the scene (or donate 
items) to try to give support. While this collective phenomenon is important for 
understanding, and planning for, broader patterns of behaviour around such events, it is 
outside the scope of the present article because it is different from the problem of explaining 
collective behaviour among those within, and threatened by, the emergency or disaster. 
Finally, there are other literatures that will also not be discussed here, for similar reasons 
of scope and relevance, including the literature on individual variation in decision-making 
among survivors (including research on freezing; e.g., Leach, 2004),1 the clinical literature on 
mental health responses (such as PTSD and anxiety) to emergencies (e.g., Norris, Friedman, 
Watson, Byrne, Diaz, & Kaniasty, 2002), the literature on organisational resilience in 
disasters (Tierney & Trainor, 2004), and the literature on the communication of risks and 
warnings in emergencies (e.g., Rogers, Amlôt, Rubin, Wessely, & Krieger, 2007). In short, 
what this review seeks to explain is the collective aspects of survivor behaviour in 
emergencies and disasters, and in particular how and when forms of social support occur 
within an event. Hence the focus here is on crowd behaviour and psychology. 
BEHAVIOUR IN EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 
The “panic” tradition 
                                                 
1 There is an important distinction between those theories that set out to explain variation between individuals in 
responses to emergencies (such as that of Leach, 2004) and those individual-mechanism focused theories that 
set out to explain collective responses (such as that of Mawson, 2007). 
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The scientific study of mass emergency behaviour was first prompted by a concern in the 
military that soldiers were losing discipline when under attack by the enemy (e.g., Schultz, 
1965; Strauss, 1944). These early explanations drew upon the crowd psychology of Gustave 
Le Bon (1895/1965) to explain what they saw as the delusionary beliefs, excessive emotion, 
and uncontrolled fleeing behaviour in these troops (Bendersky, 2007). On the one hand, such 
“mass panic” in a crowd was understood as the dissolution of existing social bonds (Freud, 
1921/1985); when people were overcome by fear, it was argued, individualistic (competitive) 
flight impulses supersede socialised group norms (Quarantelli, 1954, 1957). On the other 
hand, the concept of “contagion” was employed by a number of these theorists to explain 
how these excessive fears and uncontrolled behaviours became shared, with crowds being 
considered a particularly susceptible channel for such uncritical transmission processes (e.g., 
McDougall, 1920; Ross, 1908). 
Four kinds of problems with the notion of “mass panic” can be discussed. The first has to 
do with how one judges a behaviour as panic, with its implication of irrationality. Within an 
emergency, people often have very limited information, and so what appears post hoc and 
from an external perspective to be an overreaction (such as running frantically following a 
bomb blast) might be reasonable and proportionate from the perspective of those involved 
(Sime, 1990).  
Second, the term “panic” is not used consistently. The term is common in mass media 
and lay descriptions of behavioural responses to emergencies (Fahy et al., 2012), and can 
refer to sudden fear and associated sensations, such as racing heart, sweating, and shaking; 
and researchers use the term to refer to (uncontrolled) fleeing behaviour, and/or possible 
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feelings underlying this behaviour, and/or outcomes of this behaviour (such as crushes) 
(Sime, 1990; Quarantelli, 2001).2 
The third problem is that many studies of emergencies that meet all the conditions for 
crowd panic (threat, a crowd, and only limited escape), find little evidence for it. These 
include Janis’s (1951) study of behavioural reactions to the Hiroshima bombing, and 
Sheppard et al.’s (2006) analysis of the 1995 Sarin attack in Tokyo, the 9/11 World Trade 
Center attack, anthrax incidents in the USA in 2001, the July 7th London bombings, and 
chemical weapons attacks during World War I. Though mass panic has been called a 
“disaster myth” by sociologists (e.g., Wenger, Dykes, Sebok, & Neff, 1975), these studies 
reporting an absence of panic do not in themselves falsify the mass panic concept, of course; 
like Popper’s (1959) example of the white swan, there may still be counter-examples. A 
review of public responses to bombing raids during World War II by Jones, Woolven, 
Durodié, and Wessley (2006) concludes that mass panic is “rare” and where it occurs is only 
short-lived.  
The fourth problem with the concept of “mass panic” is the fact that, as noted earlier, one 
of the most frequently observed behavioural responses in emergencies is the very opposite to 
that which “panic” theories would predict. The evidence of widespread supportive behaviours 
undermines the notions of both individualistic flight and mindless contagion as default 
responses. For example, in contrast to the dominant representations of the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina as a descent into barbarism (Tierney, Bevc, & Kuligowski, 2006), 
Rodríguez, Trainor, and Quarantelli (2006) document how survivors commandeered boats to 
rescue their neighbours, improvised communal shelters, and located supplies for others. 
While these examples refer to a disaster rather than an escape situation, studies of emergency 
                                                 
2 A related issue here is that the term panic can also be used as a blaming device and criticism (Cocking & 
Drury, 2014) – hence its usefulness as a form of social critique in the concept of a moral panic (Cohen, 1972).  
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evacuations also find evidence that those affected attempt to help, including at the Beverly 
Hills Supper Club fire of 1977 (Johnson, 1988), the 2003 Station nightclub fire (Aguirre, 
Torres, Gill, & Hotchkiss, 2011), and the 1997 Umbria-Marche earthquake (Prati, Catufi, & 
Pietrantoni, 2012). A recent interview study of 125 survivors from a range of emergencies 
and disasters across different European countries found that the most common behaviour 
people reported witnessing was helping (Grimm, Hulse, Preiss, & Schmidt, 2014). Moreover, 
as well as this evidence of help, there is also evidence of cooperation and order more broadly. 
For example, Chertkoff and Kushigian (1999) describe the 1993 evacuation of the World 
Trade Center as calm and with a smooth flow of people down the stairs; most people gave 
support to others, despite the darkness, smoke, and uncertainty. 
While social support is common, this is not the case in all emergency evacuations, and 
there is also some variation over time and within events. A way is needed to conceptualise 
and explain behaviour in those mass emergencies that do not go so well, without accepting 
the problematic assumptions of “mass panic”. One approach is to argue that when panic does 
occur it is not a crowd phenomenon but rather is limited to small numbers of individuals – for 
example, just “1/124 (0.8%)” of people at the World Trade Center evacuation “panicked” 
(Blake, Galea, Westeng & Dixon, 2004, p. 5). Another approach is more behavioural, which 
avoids the inherent problems of judging whether or not a response is irrational – for example, 
seeking to identify the psychological and situational conditions under which people push 
others aside (rather than cooperating). Thus Chertkoff and Kushigian (1999) compared 
emergency evacuations that went well with those that went badly; they suggest that those 
emergencies where pushing and trampling was more likely are characterised by severe 
restrictions on passage space and evacuees having only limited knowledge about exits.  
Even in cases where there is pushing and shoving, however, the responsibility of the 
crowd for fatalities in emergencies has been overstated. Two of the most widely cited 
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emergencies that ended in tragedy are the fire at Chicago’s Iroquois Theatre in 1903, in 
which nearly 600 people died, and the Cocoanut Grove theatre fire of 1942, where nearly 500 
people died. In both cases, a number of sources have claimed that the deaths were due 
primarily to the escape behaviour of the crowd (e.g., Forsyth, 1999). However, Chertkoff and 
Kushigian’s (1999) systematic re-examination of both events concluded that in neither case 
was the verdict “death by mass panic” justified. In the Cocoanut Grove theatre fire, for 
example, while some people were knocked aside and stepped on in the rush to try to get out, 
most people died not from the behaviour of others, but from fumes and a fireball as a result of 
being trapped inside a building with inadequate exits. 
Social norms: Rules and roles 
Sociological normative approaches stress that, in both mundane social situations and 
emergencies, behaviour is structured by social norms that guide and constrain what people 
do, ensuring sociality and delimiting individual competition (Aguirre, 2005). Emergent norm 
theory (Turner & Killian, 1972) suggests that some of these norms are constructed within the 
emergency itself (Aguirre, Wenger, & Vigo, 1998; Connell, 2001) but also that pre-existing 
roles and rules also continue to operate, even in “extraordinary” events (McPhail, 1991). 
Evidence for normative approaches includes the finding that men attempted to help 
women more than vice versa (i.e., gender role conformity) in the crush at a concert by the 
rock group, The Who (Johnson, 1987), and the greater assistance offered to the elderly and 
infirm than the able-bodied in the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire (Feinberg & Johnson, 
2001). Frey et al.’s (2010) comparison of behaviour during the sinking of the Titanic with 
that during the sinking of the Lusitania reported data consistent with the claim that social 
norms (such as “women and children first”) operate in escape emergencies only when there is 
relatively little time pressure; when time pressure is strong, Frey et al. argue, individual 
competition predominates. However, Johnson’s (1988) study of the Beverly Hills Supper 
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Club fire, in which 165 people died, found that while competition increased when danger of 
death was closer, behaviour was still constrained by norms and family roles.  
The usefulness of a normative approach is that it seems to explain a range of different 
evacuation behaviours (not just social support) as meaningful and socially determined. For 
example, Donald and Canter’s (1990, 1992) study of the King’s Cross disaster of 1987, in 
which 31 people died in a fire in the underground station, showed how fatal use of familiar 
exits rather than fire exits reflected conformity to established place rules for many of those 
trying to escape. The risk of the normative approach is that, without further specification, it 
merely re-describes behaviour (as in Turner & Killian’s, 1972, account of a “panic” norm; 
see p. 81). In terms of process, the questions that need to be addressed are: which norms, 
when, and why? Social psychological theories, such as self-categorisation theory (Turner et 
al., 1987), suggest that we are each aware of many different norms, corresponding to our 
different group memberships. Some of these norms might be in competition with each other. 
From a psychological perspective, normative approaches require supplementation with 
explanations of norm-activation and social identity salience. 
Existing interpersonal bonds 
In addition to the role of social norms, Johnson’s (1987, 1988) studies suggested that family 
and friend relationships among survivors structured responses and were the basis of much of 
the social support provided. Thus people often tried to remain in their existing affiliation 
groups during the evacuation of the Beverly Hills Supper Club, even if it delayed their own 
exit (Cornwell, 2003; Feinberg & Johnson, 2001). A more psychological version of this kind 
of explanation is provided by Mawson (2005, 2007). His affiliation approach suggests that, in 
the face of threat, we are motivated to seek the familiar rather than simply exit, because the 
presence of familiar others (i.e., affiliates) has a calming effect, working against a “fight or 
flight” reaction.  
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An example of evidence for the affiliation approach is provided by Sime’s (1983) study 
of the fire at the Summerland leisure complex on the Isle of Man in 1973, in which 50 people 
died. Statistical analysis of accounts collected from survivors shortly after the fire suggested 
that people in family groups tried to exit as groups, not as individuals, whereas groups made 
up of both strangers and affiliates made less effort to stay together. A more recent test, 
however, found less support for the predictions of the affiliation approach. A survey of 
survivors of the December 2013 Haiyan (Philippines) typhoon found evidence of widespread 
solidarity with strangers, even in the presence of threat and in the absence of attachment 
figures (Bartolucci & Magni, 2017), conditions which, according to Mawson (2005, 2007), 
should have led to mass panic. 
The emphasis on existing social bonds in these accounts of behaviour in emergencies is 
in line with the major framework – in both theory and policy – for explaining sociality 
following disasters: social capital (e.g., Twigger-Ross, Coates, Deeming, Orr, Ramsden, & 
Stafford, 2011). This concept refers to (interpersonal) networks of trust that facilitate 
coordinated action (for a critical analysis of the use of the concept of social capital in relation 
to disasters, see Uekusa, 2017). However, while there is much evidence that existing social 
bonds are important in shaping behaviour in crowds (and communities) in emergencies, such 
social bonds are not always necessary to explain collective behaviour. In many major 
incidents, the crowd comprises strangers as well as affiliates, yet still there is evidence of 
widespread helping and other forms of social coordination among these strangers (Clarke, 
2002). There is also substantial evidence to suggest that, as well as existing relationships 
structuring behaviour, new relationships are formed within emergencies, based on the 
common experience of the emergency itself. 
Emergent groupness 
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A number of researchers have suggested that the basis of widespread helping in emergencies 
and disasters is what we might call “emergent groupness” (e.g., Clarke, 2002; Jencson, 2001; 
Jong, Whitehouse, Kavanagh, & Lane, 2015; Paton & Irons, 2016; Solnit, 2009; Walker-
Springett, Butler, & Adger, 2017). Fritz (1961/1996) was among the first sociologists to 
suggest this; his observation of the “Blitz spirit” in London during World War II led him to 
argue that, in a disaster, social boundaries dissolve – groups who previously saw themselves 
as different now saw themselves as one. Fritz referred to this as the “therapeutic community” 
of sufferers, while Barton (1969) termed it the “altruistic community”. “Disaster community” 
is another term for this phenomenon (e.g., Wright, Ursano, Bartone, & Ingraham, 1990). 
In a nuanced review of the relevant evidence, Kaniasty and Norris (1999) point out that 
these “post disaster democracies” do not occur in all disasters, and, where they do occur, the 
disaster community does not distribute aid equally, with structural differences in advantage 
often being reproduced and even exacerbated. Recent survey work in social psychology has 
suggested that, where there is already salient inequality, advantaged majority group members 
may be less ready than disadvantaged minorities to see all as a single group (Vezzali, 
Andrighetto, Drury, Di Bernardo, & Cadamuro, 2017). Despite these caveats, there is 
agreement among a number of researchers on the importance of emergent groupness in 
emergencies and disasters, both phenomenologically and in terms of behaviours. The idea of 
groupness as the basis for social support in emergencies also resonates with the social identity 
approach, in particular with self-categorisation theory, as I discuss next. 
A SOCIAL IDENTITY MODEL OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR IN 
EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS 
A basic principle of self-categorisation theory (SCT; Turner, 1982, 1985; Turner et al., 1987; 
Turner et al., 1994) is that collective behaviour is possible when there is a shared social 
identity. Reicher’s (1984, 1987) research on the St Pauls riot showed that this principle could 
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be used to explain normative crowd behaviour in novel situations. Subsequent research, again 
on riots, showed that the fact of sharing social identity with others in a novel and dangerous 
crowd event could be the basis of displaying solidarity towards them (Reicher, 1996). These 
points are relevant to the case of mass emergency behaviour, since here too there is a novel 
and dangerous crowd situation where there is a need for social support. The social identity 
model of collective behaviour in emergencies and disasters thus suggests that shared social 
identity is the basis of action to provide support to others; it adds that the basis of this shared 
identity is the common fate shared by those in an emergency.  
Antecedents of shared social identity. The assemblage of people facing an emergency 
may already see themselves as members of a single social category; or they may see 
themselves as part of separate groups within the crowd; or they may see themselves simply as 
individuals or in dyads unconnected with any others present. In other words, the physical 
crowd of people co-present may contain one or more than one psychological crowds 
(Reicher, 2011), or none at all. However, the shared nature of the fire, bombing, or other 
threat can operate to make these people see themselves as grouped together as one. In Gestalt 
terms, the social “figure and ground” shifts from “me in relation to other individuals” to “us 
in relation to the emergency”. Thus common fate operates as a form of comparative fit, 
enhancing perceptions of within-group similarity and clarifying group boundaries (Turner, 
1981) in relation to the emergency. It is the basis of emergent shared social identity with 
others in the same situation. The process is similar to that described by Reicher (1996) and 
Stott (Stott & Reicher, 1998; Stott & Drury, 1999, 2000) in studies of crowd conflict where 
indiscriminate police action creates more inclusive ingroup boundaries in a crowd. However, 
in the case of an emergency, the “other” which serves to define survivors as one is not an 
outgroup but the emergency itself. 
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Consequences of shared social identity. Once the boundaries of concern have been 
extended from the personal self to a collective self – which might be defined as “those of us 
affected by the emergency” – this shared social identity motivates helping, cooperation, and 
also broader forms of solidarity such as courtesy. In this account, it is assumed that we 
normally orient to, and care about, “our” own wellbeing. However, since who “we” are varies 
as a function of level of self-categorisation, so too do self-interest and other motivations. 
The proposition that shared identity increases supportive behaviour towards ingroup 
members is one that has previously been inferred from research and theory on common 
ingroup identity (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 2012). Although this kind of approach has 
principally been applied to understanding intergroup relations (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & 
Dovidio, 1989), it has also been used to predict intragroup behaviour. For example, in social 
dilemmas, a common level of self-categorisation has been shown to constrain personal 
resource use (Kramer & Brewer, 1984) and to increase concern for, and contributions to, the 
collective interest (Wit & Kerr, 2002). The notion that shared identity increases helping for 
those in need has previously been shown in Levine’s experimental studies of bystander 
intervention literature, again based on SCT (Levine & Crowther, 2008; Levine, Prosser, 
Evans, & Reicher, 2005; Slater et al., 2013). However, the social identity model described 
here differs from these similar SCT-based approaches in that it applies to ingroup-supportive 
behaviour in events where there is time pressure and threat, and it suggests that the common 
identity in question is one specific to, and emergent of, that threatening context. 
The first research evidence for the social identity model is described in the next section, 
which is organised in three parts, reflecting three methodological strands: experimental 
studies; a case study of the July 7th 2005 London bombings; and a comparative design 
interview study. 
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EVIDENCE FOR THE ROLE OF SHARED SOCIAL IDENTITY IN 
EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS 
The rationale for a mixed-methods approach, combining different research designs to 
approach the question of collective behaviour in emergencies from different angles, was that 
of methodological triangulation (Denzin, 1970). Rather than working sequentially, using 
qualitative research to develop hypotheses for quantitative tests, as in some mixed-methods 
approaches, our aim was to carry out complementary strands of research activity in parallel. 
Quantitative hypotheses were present from the start, being derived from the basic tenets of 
self-categorisation theory (as explained above). The qualitatively-based studies did indeed 
serve to suggest new hypotheses, but these only became clear after the experimental work 
had already started. Hence, in the narrative below, we present the experimental evidence first. 
Experimental evidence  
We developed an experimental paradigm to test the hypothesis that, in an emergency 
evacuation, where there is a salient shared social identity there will be greater social support 
for strangers and fewer individually competitive behaviours than when there is no (or low) 
salient shared social identity. We created a computer visualisation of a fire in, and evacuation 
from, an underground rail station, using similar simulation techniques to those employed in 
computer games (Drury, Cocking, Reicher et al., 2009). Participants seated at a computer 
viewed and controlled a character moving through the station, with commentary describing a 
fire breaking out and the need to evacuate as quickly as possible. The scene was populated by 
other individuals, who could be presented as members of the participant’s own group or 
simply as other people, to vary the level of shared social identity. The urgency of the escape 
was represented by a “danger bar”, indicating how long the participant had to escape death. 
During the evacuation, the participant received requests for help from four fallen characters 
(acceding to which would delay their own exit) and had unlimited opportunities to push other 
17 
 
characters aside on the crowded escalators. Both helping and pushing could be carried out 
through the press of a single key. Thus the paradigm included behavioural measures, as well 
as self-report measures including identification with the crowd, liking of the characters, and 
concern for others. 
In one study (N = 72), we randomly assigned student participants to low versus high 
shared identification conditions. In the low identification condition, we asked participants to 
think of themselves in terms of their personal identity and we described the crowd in the 
simulation as “tourists, shoppers, and commuters”, in the high identification condition, we 
asked participants to think of themselves in terms of their identity as students and we 
described the crowd as “fellow students.” However, our manipulation checks found that 
levels of identification with the crowd were close to the scale mid-point across conditions – 
possibly because the manipulation was not engaging enough – which meant that we could not 
test for group differences. Nevertheless, regression analyses showed that identification with 
the crowd predicted the number of helping behaviours and (negatively) the number of times 
other characters were pushed aside, in line with the social identity explanation. In addition, 
concern for others mediated the relationship between social identification and helping 
behaviour. 
In a further study (N = 40), student participants were defined either as part of a crowd of 
shoppers (low identification condition) or fans of the same football team (high identification 
condition).3 As expected, there was significantly more help offered in high-identification (M 
= 0.70, SD = 0.29) than in low-identification (M = 0.48, SD = 0.27) conditions. As predicted, 
                                                 
3 There is clearly a potential confound in designs such as these, which use social groups that have well-
established stereotypes, as a way of operationalising shared identity. Our decision to use such groups was based 
on the reasoning that minimal groups might be less engaging for these kinds of experiments. In the case of the 
second experiment described here, while it is true that the “football fan” identity has a number of associations, it 
is not clear that it is particularly associated with a norm of helping behaviour. 
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low-identification participants also pushed more (M = 18.39, SD = 12.20) than did high-
identification participants (M = 9.26, SD = 8.54). 
These simulation experiments provide some prima facie evidence that shared social 
identity in an emergency increases supportive behaviours and reduces competitive 
behaviours, compared to when there is no shared social identity. While there is a history of 
social psychology studies of escape behaviours using laboratory methods (e.g., Chertkoff, 
Kushigian, & McCool, 1996; Gross, Kelley, Kruglanski, & Patch, 1972; Mintz, 1951), some 
of these were conducted at a time when ethics committees had less sway, and therefore real 
threats (of pain) could easily be included in the design to add realism (e.g., Kelley, Condry, 
Dahlke, & Hill, 1965; Klein, 1976). Our own designs did not include any threats (real or 
bogus), and so lack the key element that defines an emergency and which can be expected to 
impact on helping behaviour. The low ecological validity of the design therefore meant that 
real-world studies were also necessary. 
A further issue is that, when these experiments were designed, we were still operating 
with a somewhat static conception of the role of social identity processes in emergencies. We 
assumed that people in crowds without a shared social identity remained that way throughout 
the emergency. However, our studies of real-life emergencies indicated that a more dynamic 
account was required, more in line with the ideas on “emergent groupness” described above. 
The best example is our study of survivor behaviours during the July 7th 2005 London 
bombings, for in this case the crowd (of commuters) had no shared social identity prior to the 
explosions but behaved as if they did immediately afterwards.  
Collective behaviour in the July 7th London bombings 
On July 7th 2005, four bombs exploded on the London transport system, three on 
underground trains and one on a bus. Fifty-six people were killed (including the four 
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bombers) and over 700 were injured. Those who survived on the tube trains were left 
underground, literally and figuratively in the dark for a significant period of time before they 
emerged or the emergency services reached them (London Assembly, 2006). While a number 
of studies have examined post-traumatic stress among the survivors (e.g., Brewin, Scragg, 
Robertson, Thompson, d'Ardenne, & Ehlers, 2008) and subsequent behaviours among 
Londoners more generally (e.g., Rubin, Brewin, Greenberg et al., 2007), our own study was 
unique in that it was concerned with the social-psychological question of how survivors 
behaved – and specifically the extent to which they behaved supportively and as a group – in 
the bombed trains in the immediate aftermath of the explosions (Drury, Cocking, & Reicher, 
2009b; see also Cocking, Drury, & Reicher, 2009, and Cocking, 2013). 
The high profile of the event meant that there was considerable media coverage in the 
days afterwards, including many statements from survivors quoted in the press. There was 
also an inquest by the London Assembly (2006), which included some extremely detailed 
(and harrowing) accounts from those who survived. Our study made use of these as well as 
survivor accounts in other secondary sources, many of which were produced in the day or so 
after the events. Our estimate of the number of different survivors in our secondary data-base 
was 90 survivors, plus 56 witnesses.4 These secondary sources varied in quality and did not 
always refer to the issues that interested us. Therefore, we also needed to carry out primary 
data collection so we could ask survivors not only what they did (and what they saw other 
people do), but also what their relationship with others in the train carriages was like, what 
motivated them, and whether they felt in danger. We interviewed 12 survivors face-to-face 
and obtained written responses to our questions from a further seven. All the material was 
coded and analysed using a theory-driven version of thematic analysis. 
                                                 
4 All sources were checked and cross-referenced to make sure we were not double-counting. 
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We found that, overwhelmingly, and consistently across the different data sources, 
survivors described witnessing (and receiving) help, and many described giving help – 
including giving reassurance, sharing water, physically supporting people as they evacuated, 
checking that others were OK, and even tying tourniquets. Only a small number described 
personally selfish behaviours (such as pushing others). While there is an obvious possibility 
of bias, in that people may report their own behaviour in a positive light, arguably this applies 
less when reporting the behaviours of others.5 We were therefore confident that supportive 
behaviour was common amongst survivors.  
One possible explanation for the prevalence of supportive behaviour in this emergency is 
that survivors felt that the danger had passed: since the explosions were over, perhaps it was 
no longer subjectively an escape situation. If this was the case, then survivors would calculate 
that there was little cost or risk attached to giving help. However, in both the interviews and 
the secondary data, there was clear evidence of a continuing perceived danger of death. 
Qualitatively, survivors referred to concern that the tunnel would collapse, that the rail was 
live, that there would be a secondary device; quantitatively, only one interviewee (and none 
of those quoted contemporaneously) said they did not feel in danger of death, while 12 
interviewees (and 70 of those quoted spontaneously) said they did feel in such danger. 
A second possible explanation for the prevalence of supportive behaviour is in terms of 
existing interpersonal bonds (Johnson, 1988; Mawson, 2007). However, the explosions took 
place during morning rush hour. Therefore, most people on the trains and bus were 
commuters rather than families or groups of friends. In our data, only 12 survivors said they 
were with people they knew, while 63 said they were among strangers.  
                                                 
5 Though it might be argued that shared social identity means that the same bias would transfer to the group 
level. 
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We examined the secondary sources for references from survivors to a sense of unity 
with others in the carriages, which we took as evidence of shared social identity. While 
numbers reporting this (26) were small in absolute terms, numbers reporting disunity were 
much smaller (0). The interviews allowed us to examine this question of shared identity more 
directly. When we asked people about their experience prior to the explosions, a number of 
interviewees described competition and feelings of separateness in relation to other individual 
users of the underground railway. With reference to their relationship with others in the 
carriages immediately after the explosion, however, 11 respondents were explicit that there 
was a strong sense of unity – or “we-ness” (cf. Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, & 
Clark, 1991) – in the crowd (i.e., that they felt it themselves and/or that they saw it in others), 
and only one spoke about disunity. They also used rich vocabulary to describe the experience, 
including “unity”, “together”, “similarity”, “affinity”, “part of a group”, “everybody, didn’t 
matter what colour or nationality”, “you thought these people knew each other”, and 
“teamness”.  
Moreover, this experience of unity seemed to be associated with social support. In the 
secondary sources, 14 of the 26 survivors who reported feeling unity also reported helping 
(each more than once). Of our eleven respondents in the primary sources who described 
experiencing unity, ten described helping others.  
Where respondents offered an explanation for the feeling of unity, they attributed it to 
their shared experience of threat and danger (five interviewees); the “we” in the “we-talk” 
(cf. Smith, Gavin, & Sharp, 2015) was in relation to the explosion: 
I felt that we’re all in the same boat together [ ]6 and then for the feelings that I was 
feeling could well have been felt by them as well ‘cos I don’t think any normal human 
                                                 
6 Square brackets indicate text edited out to save space. 
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being could just calmly sat there going oh yeah this is great [ ] it was a stressful situation 
and we were all in it together and the best way to get out of it was to help each other … 
yeah so I felt exactly I felt quite close to the people near me. (Interview 1) 
Thus common fate seemed to be the basis of a new shared social identity for these 
survivors. 
As a case study, the London bombings analysis was limited in its ability to provide 
evidence about the role of common fate and shared social identity. In the first place, due to 
the difficulty of getting people to talk about such distressing experiences, the interview part 
of the dataset was small. Second, the dataset as a whole was low in variability (for example, 
reports of help were overwhelming), which meant that it was difficult to make comparisons 
and show the effects associated with different levels of key variables. What was needed to 
provide a better examination of the social identity approach to mass emergency behaviour 
was a study using a comparative design. 
The comparative design study 
For our comparative design study (Drury, Cocking, & Reicher, 2009a), we sought to 
interview survivors of different emergencies, by placing advertisements in UK national 
newspapers. We also snowballed an initial sample and tried to contact people who had been 
involved in one well-known disaster, the Hillsborough, UK, football stadium crush (1989) 
and one local near-disaster, the Big Beach Boutique 2 music event in Brighton, UK (2002).  
We originally intended to test a simple social identity hypothesis that crowds with (a 
given) shared social identity would display social support behaviours whereas crowds with 
low or no shared social identity would display individualistic (competitive or “panic”) 
behaviour. However, the stories people told us were complex. Rather than a shared social 
identity in the crowd prior to the emergency being the basis of helping behaviour, as with the 
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London bombings there was evidence in many cases that this sense of shared identity 
emerged within the event. This time, however, there was some variability among participants 
on a number of dimensions of interest, which allowed us to make comparisons. 
Twenty-one participants (11 male, 10 female) took part in the study, with experiences of 
11 different events, including fires, sinking ships, crowd crushes, and evacuations from 
buildings. Most were genuine emergencies (sinking of the Jupiter, sinking of the Oceanos, 
Hillsborough football stadium disaster, Accra [Ghana] football stadium crush, Bradford 
football stadium fire, fire at Sonesta Hotel [Cambridge, Massachusetts], Harrods bomb), 
some were false alarms (Canary Wharf and Frankfurt tower block emergency evacuations), 
and one was a “near-disaster” (Big Beach Boutique 2 music event), but in each case there 
was perceived danger of death, a crowd, and an apparently time-limited exit. Due again to the 
difficulty in getting people to talk about distressing events, the number is small for a 
quantitative analysis, though within an acceptable range for a qualitative interview study. 
We used an interview schedule and form of analysis similar to the one used in the 
London bombings study. Shared social identification was again operationalised in terms of 
references to feelings of “unity” or “togetherness” with the rest of the crowd; and common 
fate was operationalised in terms of references to shared danger. We included as “helping” 
such behaviours as helping people to their feet, moving objects so that others could escape 
more quickly, giving encouragement, sharing bottles of water, and giving information and 
advice. Behaviours defined as personally selfish included barging or pushing others aside, 
ignoring others in need, trying to step in ahead of others, and ignoring pleas for help. We 
distinguished helping from more everyday forms of cooperative or “orderly” conduct (cf. 
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Reicher & Haslam, 2010) including order and calm,7 adherence to everyday rules, 
maintenance of social roles, and courtesy vs discourtesy. Each of these could contribute to an 
organised, coordinated evacuation.  
While there was evidence for identification with the crowd in most of the survivors 
interviewed, there was also some variability in these reports. We asked an independent judge 
to sort the accounts into two groups: those interviewees who said their unity with the crowd 
was low (or who were vague) (n = 9), and those who were explicit that it was high (n = 12).8 
We excluded from the operational definition of high-identifiers those who referred only to 
“unity” with the small group of known affiliates that they were already with.  
As with the London bombings study (Drury et al., 2009b), people sometimes talked 
about “panic” in different ways over the course of the interview; yet when this was unpacked 
by asking people what they meant by “panic”, the same people often described helping 
behaviour alongside their fear (Cocking & Drury, 2014). Across the sample as a whole, most 
interviewees (17, or 81%) reported observing multiple instances of helping among other 
survivors. However, whereas most people who identified with the crowd (10, or 66%) 
reported giving help (and together reported 14 separate instances of such help), only a 
minority of people who did not identify with the crowd (3, or 33%) reported giving help (and 
they reported a total of seven separate instances of giving help).9 A similar pattern obtained 
for the “orderly” behaviours – see Table 1, below. 
                                                 
7 In retrospect, the linking of “calmness” with orderliness is problematic, because it suggests that emotionality is 
the issue. It is possible for a relatively unemotional crowd to block a door if their exit is uncoordinated (Mintz, 
1951), and for a frightened or angry crowd to display self-organisation. 
8 These levels of unity varied within events as well as between them; for example, two interviewees at the Big 
Beach Boutique 2 were classified as low and two others at the same event were classified as high. 
9 While the numbers for personally selfish behaviours were the reverse of predictions, the numbers were so low 
that the comparison is probably meaningless: low-identifiers 0% of interviewees (0 instances), high-identifiers 
8% (1 instance). 
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---Insert Table 1 about here--- 
While the analysis focused on level of self-categorisation, the data on orderliness can 
also be used to suggest how existing commitments (norms, values, roles) might operate in 
emergency contexts – something missing, as noted above, in sociological accounts of norms 
in emergencies (e.g., Johnson, 1987). Thus perhaps those survivors classified as high in 
shared social identification were more likely than others to report conforming to norms and 
acting within roles during the events because more identification with a social category 
defined only in terms of the emergency meant greater conformity to norms and roles thought 
to be generic to “we-ness”.  
Some of our interviewees reported feeling unity with the crowd before the event. 
However, all except one of those with this prior sense of identification reported that their 
feeling of unity increased, either in strength or, as in the following example, in inclusiveness, 
in response to the emergency: 
I think everyone would accept that one had really gone beyond the definition of 
identifying the person as a as a supporter of football, at this point, they’re just human 
beings struggling, to be fair. I don’t think anyone saw Liverpool fans and Notts Forest 
fans [ ] People stopped being supporters of a football team and were just people. 
(Hillsborough interview 2) 
Across the sample as whole, most survivors reported both feeling in danger and 
perceiving this feeling to be shared across the crowd. Importantly, however, and as expected, 
reports of shared danger were slightly more numerous for high-identification (11, or 92% of 
the interviewees) than low-identification (6, or 66%) survivors. Moreover, some high-
identification participants explicitly explained the feeling of unity in terms of the shared fate 
of the crowd as a whole. 
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It is largely in the nature of research studies on emergencies and disasters that sampling 
and control procedures cannot normally be implemented in the same way as for studies of 
many other topics. There are therefore caveats to be borne in mind when interpreting these 
results: the interviewees were self-selecting and may not be typical of those who survived 
these events; some of the interviews took place years after the events, and so memory10 as 
well as self-presentational biases may be operating. Nevertheless, there is a pattern to these 
results that reinforces and extends the findings of the studies described earlier (Drury et al., 
2009b; Drury, Cocking, Reicher et al., 2009). In summary, comparing accounts of those who 
experienced a strong versus a weak sense of identity with other survivors across different 
emergency events suggests that common fate was an antecedent of shared identification, and 
that providing support and more general orderly behaviour were some of the consequences. 
Therefore, the study suggests that variability in social support and other forms of collective 
behaviour in emergencies can be explained by variability in the perception of common fate 
(or other contextual features positioning people as a group) and hence in shared social 
identity. 
Convergent evidence 
Convergent evidence from research on disasters for the proposition that comparative context 
creates a new shared social identity among those affected by an emergency, and for the 
proposition that shared identity increases supportive behaviour for ingroup members, is 
provided in recent research on some of the consequences of the earthquakes which took place 
in the north Italian region of Emilia-Romagna in 2012. In a study by Vezzali, Cadamuro, 
Versari, Giovannini, and Trifiletti (2015), Italian and migrant schoolchildren completed a 
questionnaire six months after the earthquakes. Among Italians, perceived exposure to the 
                                                 
10 Though some research suggests that extreme events (e.g., earthquakes) are remembered better when there is 
personal involvement (Neisser, 1996; Prati et al., 2012). 
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disaster was positively associated with representing self and others affected as part of a single 
group. Vezzali et al. (2015) used the notion “altruism born of suffering” (Staub & Vollhardt, 
2006; Vollhardt, 2009)11 to explain why experiencing the disaster led to shared identification 
and support, paralleling the notion of common fate in the social identity approach. Among 
migrant children, perceived disaster exposure was not associated with one-group 
representation, which may have been due to the enduring salience of status differences 
between groups (Vezzali et al., 2017). A second study, this time on adults in the same 
affected population, found that disaster exposure led to a single group representation in the 
minority group (Andrighetto, Vezzali, Bergamini, Nadi, & Giovannini, 2016). Both studies 
found that perceiving others affected by the emergency as a single group predicted helping 
motivations. 
The scope of these earthquake studies differs from our studies described above (Drury et 
al., 2009a, 2009b) in that their focus was not on crowd behaviour within the emergency itself, 
but rather the effects within a wider social group after the event. Nevertheless, parallels in 
hypothesised processes are clear. A second analysis of the data from schoolchildren was 
carried out specifically to combine hypotheses from the two strands of work (Vezzali, Drury, 
Cadamuro, & Versari, 2016). The children reported posttraumatic stress symptoms caused by 
the earthquake. As these stresses were experienced collectively, we reasoned that they would 
operate as a common fate. Indeed, level of symptoms predicted inclusion of the other in the 
                                                 
11 Staub and Vollhardt (2006) note that numerous studies have found a correlation between involvement in 
suffering and helping behaviour, including many from the disaster literature. Vollhardt (2009) suggests that the 
experience of suffering provides a new motivation and proposes that mechanisms could include empathy, 
perceived common fate, and shared social identification with other victims.  
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self (IOS),12 and IOS predicted one-group representation of all children affected by the 
quake. IOS also predicted contact intentions, and one-group representation predicted helping 
intentions towards other affected children. While these data were only correlational, the 
proposal model made more theoretical sense than different arrangements of the same 
variables, and was found to provide better fit than four alternative models. 
This section has described the first set of studies we carried out to investigate the role of 
social identity processes in mass emergency behaviour. Using different methodologies 
(experimental, interview, and archive), there was a pattern of consistent support for the notion 
that shared social identity is the basis of providing support to others within a mass 
emergency, and that the emergency itself, through the experience of common fate, is the basis 
for that (emergent) shared social identity. In addition, survey studies of post-disaster 
identification processes and support behaviours provide convergent evidence for these social 
identity hypotheses. In the next section, I flesh out the social identity model of collective 
behaviour in emergencies and disasters by deriving mediators and further outcomes. 
MEDIATORS AND FURTHER OUTCOMES 
Figure 1 shows an expanded version of the basic social identity model, including more 
specification of the mechanisms underlying collective behaviour in emergencies as well as 
                                                 
12 This study took IOS as a measure of identity-fusion. Identity-fusion has been predicted, and found, to lead to 
greater self-sacrificial behaviours for others (Gómez et al., 2011; Swann et al., 2014) and has been used to 
explain supportive convergence behaviour in an emergency (Buhrmester, Fraser, Lanman, Whitehouse, & 
Swann, 2015). The concepts of identity-fusion and social identification are similar, and conceptually it might be 
argued that identity-fusion itself can imply some degree of social categorisation in that one or more individuals 
are being grouped with self and distinguished from other individuals. It is also worth noting that personally self-
sacrificial behaviours were found among some of the survivors of the July 7th London bombings, which we 
explained in terms of shared social identity, not identity-fusion (Drury et al., 2009b). 
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some further outcomes (Drury, 2012). Some of these variables were assumed, but not 
examined or sufficiently derived, in the 2009 studies described above – in particular the role 
of expected support. Previous research on disasters suggests that this belief is crucial. For 
example, Norris and Kaniasty (1996) carried out a two-wave survey study of people affected 
by Hurricane Hugo (1989) and a similar two-wave survey of those affected by Hurricane 
Andrew (1992). Both studies were conducted in the months following the disasters and 
allowed a cross-lagged analysis to examine the role of (received) social support in disaster 
recovery. Both analyses were found to be consistent with a mediation model in which the 
stress engendered by the disaster was mitigated less by support itself than by perceived 
support.  
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
Because our concern was specifically with collective behaviour in ad hoc crowds, the 
sources for the expansion of the social identity model were Reicher’s account of 
psychological transformation in crowds (Neville & Reicher, 2011; Reicher, 2011) as well as 
our earlier work on empowerment in collective action (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2005, 2009; 
Reicher, 1996; Stott & Drury, 1999). Reicher (2011) describes three psychological 
transformations that can occur in crowds. The cognitive transformation is the shift from own 
values, goals, and standards of behaviour to shared values, goals, and standards. The 
relational transformation refers to how one responds and behaves to other people who share 
the identity. The relational transformation has two dimensions. First, in terms of solidarity: as 
well as the motivation to provide support and routine civility (“orderliness”, cooperation), 
shared identity leads people to expect support from others who share their social category 
membership. Second, in terms of validation: shared social identity means that people will 
expect and seek agreement with those in the same group and will trust their judgements. The 
affective transformation is based on the cognitive and relational transformations. Both shared 
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goals and expected support increase the sense of efficacy or empowerment, and hence the 
ability to coordinate actions, and to collectively regulate behaviour in others to ensure there is 
a properly normative collective response (think for example of a crowd needing to remove 
the door from a bombed underground train, or the 9/11 evacuees descending the stairs in 
lockstep). Expected support, and the actions that flow from that support, can be expected to 
contribute to crowd members reaching safety, and hence to their wellbeing. This account has 
elsewhere been referred to as a model of collective psychosocial resilience (e.g., Drury, 2012; 
Williams & Drury, 2009) and can be seen as part of the “social cure” approach (Haslam, 
Jetten, Cruwys, Dingle, & Haslam, 2018) because these group processes, based on shared 
social identity, are adaptive for group survival in emergencies. 
Many of these ideas were systematically and successfully tested in a cross-sectional 
survey of a representative sample of survivors of an earthquake and tsunami that took place 
in Chile in 2010 (Drury, Brown, González, & Miranda, 2015). In 2012, the MIDE UC 
Measurement Centre at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile was conducting a survey 
of solidarity behaviours among Chileans and allowed us to add to their questionnaire items 
representing variables in the social identity model. This quantitative design therefore allowed 
us to test for predictive relations and indirect effects, and take measures of overall model fit.  
The earthquake in question occurred offshore in the Maule river region, around 360 
kilometres south-west of Santiago, the capital. It resulted in a tsunami, with reported 
maximum wave heights of up to 10 metres in some locations, which hit the coast 35 minutes 
after the earthquake and caused flash floods (Lorito et al., 2011). According to some sources, 
most of the 521 fatalities were due to the earthquake, while 124 were due to the tsunami 
(Fritz et al., 2011), with many more people being seriously injured. Around 500,000 
buildings were severely damaged, and nine per cent of the population in the affected areas 
lost their homes. There were nationwide disruptions to power, roads, and telephone and other 
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communications networks. There was “looting”13 of supermarkets in some coastal towns and 
cities as people searched for water and food. With the emergency services overwhelmed, 
solidarity behaviours were essential for survival and recovery among those affected by these 
events. 
In the study, the initial sample consisted of 1354 adults (50.4% women; age range 18 to 
64 years), living in the cities of Antofagasta, Viña del Mar, Valparaíso, Concepción, 
Talcahuano, and Temuco. The sampling method was random probabilistic, stratified by 
socioeconomic status, gender and age. The questionnaire was administered face-to-face in 
Spanish by trained interviewers. From this initial sample, we selected participants in districts 
that were directly affected by the earthquake and/or tsunami and had experienced some 
threat, leaving 1240 cases in the final sample. 
We took measures of two types of behavioural outcome (providing emotional support 
and participating in coordinated activities to provide support to the community) and one 
related cognitive outcome (collective efficacy). Within the measure of participation in 
coordinated activities we included collective regulation behaviours (such as working together 
to prevent looters), because these items worked best as a single factor. In the structural 
equation model we tested, the antecedents were first disaster exposure and then common fate. 
The next level variable was social identification with those affected by the emergency, and 
the final mediator was expected support.14 Where possible, we used or adapted established 
measures (e.g., social identification; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears & Manstead, 1998). For 
                                                 
13 I problematize the term looting in this context because it is often used to lump opportunistic burglaries 
together with incidents where survivors take goods from abandoned shops for their own survival (see Tierney et 
al., 2006).  
14 Shared goals were also included as a parallel mediator to expected support, but we did not use these in the 
final model below because they did not fit well. On reflection, it was decided that this measure lacked construct 
validity as the items did not appear to map on clearly to the concept in question. 
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other items, we based the wording on both the concepts as specified in the social identity 
model and on statements from participants in our previous interview studies. 
--- Insert Figure 2 about here --- 
Confirmatory factor analysis established the coherence of the measurement model. The 
full model was run with two controls (socio-economic status and gender), and was found to 
have adequate fit. As Figure 2 shows, disaster exposure predicted common fate, and common 
fate predicted social identification with others affected by the disaster. Social identification 
predicted giving emotional social support as well as expected support. Social identification 
did not directly predict participation in coordinated social support or collective efficacy; but 
indirectly (through expected support), it was associated with both of these outcome variables. 
Unlike providing support to other individuals, which can stem directly from identification 
with them (Levine et al., 2005), coordination and collective efficacy are contingent upon the 
co-action of others (Drury, 2012; Drury & Reicher, 1999).  
This section described evidence that shared social identity in a disaster is the basis not 
only of providing social support, but also of expectations of social support from others, which 
in turn increases both collective efficacy and participation in coordinated support activities. 
In the next section, I consider a further role for social identity processes in mass emergency 
behaviour, focusing on responses to others’ behaviour.  
UNINTENDED SOCIAL INFLUENCE: FOLLOWING OTHERS’ BEHAVIOUR 
WITHIN AN EMERGENCY 
In an emergency, survivors’ emotional and behavioural responses are likely to be influenced 
not only by the experience of threat, but also by the reactions of other survivors. In general, 
we use others’ emotions to provide us with information about shared situations, which can 
lead to shared emotions; and we are more motivated to employ this social appraisal process 
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under conditions of uncertainty (Bruder, Fischer, & Manstead, 2014). We can infer from this 
point that, in an emergency, seeing others being anxious (or calm) will often lead people to 
feel the same. Extending the principle, it seems likely that when people see fellow survivors 
provide social support (or being neglectful) in an emergency, this can convey information 
(about expectations), and therefore increase the likelihood that they too will give support (or 
be neglectful). Likewise, the sight of people fleeing (or discounting a signal of threat) can 
influence the extent to which others also flee as well as specific exit routes taken (or instead 
delay their exit). In short, others’ reactions in emergencies and disasters can operate as 
sources of unintended social influence, leading to shared behaviours.  
Most accounts of collective behaviour in emergencies say something about this kind of 
unintended social influence. In early work, the concept of contagion was a dominant 
explanation (e.g., Le Bon, 1895/1965; McDougall, 1920; see Bendersky, 2007). The problem 
with the concept of contagion is that it suggests that influence is indiscriminate or mindless, 
and so it cannot explain evidence of social group boundaries in influence (Reicher, 1984; 
Warren & Power, 2015).  
A less “irrationalising” way of conceptualising unintended influence in ad hoc crowds is 
that of heuristics. On many occasions, observing the behaviour of the majority of people is a 
good guide for how one should behave (Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Gigerenzer, 2008). Self-
categorisation theory adds to the notion of heuristics the suggestion that we are more likely to 
take others as exemplars for our own conduct when we share a social identity with them 
(Turner et al., 1987). Applying this to novel crowd events, Reicher (1984) suggests that 
people will look to others as a guide to their own behaviour insofar as these others are clearly 
a member of the individual’s social category and as long as their behaviour does not 
contradict existing group norms (see also Turner, 1982). In the case of disasters, it can be 
argued that the prevalence of supportive behaviours in such events may be a function of both 
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the extent to which people perceive these behaviours as common in others and the extent to 
which these others are perceived as members of one’s ingroup.  
Kugihara’s (2001) experimental simulation of an emergency evacuation showed that the 
larger the group, the more likely participants were to behave the same way as others 
(aggressive or concessive response), because the salience of the (aggressive or concessive) 
norm was stronger in a larger group than in a smaller one. Although this study was argued to 
support a social identity explanation, it did not include measures of social identification. By 
contrast, our own research has included social identification measures in order to examine 
how shared social identity in a crowd operates to moderate (i.e., strengthen) the effect of 
observing (ingroup) others’ (supportive) behaviour on one’s own behaviour.  
In the Maule earthquake study described above (Drury et al., 2016), we took measures of 
participants’ observations of others’ behaviour. Initially, we were interested in these 
descriptively, but it soon became clear that they were significant predictors of the collective 
behaviour outcomes – stronger than shared social identification, in fact (see Figure 2). 
Specifically, reports of observing emotional social support predicted reports of providing 
emotional social support; and the more that people reported observing others’ coordinated 
social support, the more likely they themselves were to report involvement in providing 
coordinated social support. There were also significant effects across the different supportive 
behaviours (see Figure 2). In a cross-sectional study such as this, clearly it is difficult to 
exclude alternative interpretations of these pathways. Thus, it is likely that when people gave 
others social support, they probably saw (or were more likely to notice) others doing the 
same. (This alternative is probably more true of coordinated support, where the very act of 
giving support brings people into contact with others giving support.) However, we can at 
least say that the pathways we report here made as much theoretical and statistical sense as 
any other pathway. 
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In order to test the moderation hypothesis, we examined whether the links between 
observation and own behaviour were greater when participants identified with those they 
observed. A Wald moderation test was carried out, splitting the sample between low 
identifiers, operationally defined as those below the mean score (3.97) of the social 
identification scale (n = 440), and high-identifiers (n = 800), comprising those who scored 
higher the mean. 
----Insert Figure 3 about here---- 
Overall, the predicted moderation effect was significant. As Figure 3 shows, the links 
between observed coordinated social support and both providing emotional social support 
and providing coordinated social support were stronger amongst the high identifiers than 
amongst low identifiers. The link between observed emotional social support and giving 
emotional social support was marginally stronger for low identifiers, however, whereas the 
link between observed emotional social support and participation in coordinated social 
support was non-significant in both cases.   
The role of unintended social influence in the crowd is important in understanding not 
only the prevalence of support in an emergency but also the decision to flee (Nilsson & 
Johansson, 2009). One of the main reasons that people die in fires is that they are slow to 
make the judgement that they are in danger – sometimes because they assume the alarm to be 
false (Proulx, 2007). In such events, others’ responses are the effective signal that there is (or 
is not) real danger – as illustrated in the classic ‘smoke-filled room’ experiment by Latané 
and Darley (1968);15 and following their action can be the difference between life and death.  
                                                 
15 The results of the famous smoke-filled room experiment by Latané and Darley (1968) were interpreted to 
suggest that others’ non-responses indicated to participants that the smoke was not dangerous. However, Darley 
and Latané’s (1968) parallel study, using a (less ambiguous) epileptic seizure as the emergency, led to the 
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With students, I have recently piloted a simple study that reproduces and attempts to 
explain the well-established observation that people are more likely to ignore fire alarms if 
those around them do the same.16 In the lecture scenario presented to participants, an alarm 
sounds. In one condition the crowd immediately exits, while in the other condition the crowd 
ignores the alarm. As expected, participants largely followed the crowd (rather than the 
alarm). However, we also included a moderator measure – social identification with the 
particular crowd – and we were able to show that this effect of following the crowd was 
significantly greater when there was high identification with these others (and in fact it 
disappeared when identification was low). The argument here is not that groups are bad; 
rather, it is particular identity-contents, or norms (in this case, complacency), that may be bad 
(cf. Reicher, Spears, Postmes, & Kende, 2016). The implication is that, in emergency 
preparation and response, fire wardens and everyone who understand the risks of fire can set 
an example to others.  
In this section, I argued that although unintended influence is a major factor in mass 
emergency behaviour, there is evidence that this influence is not unthinking and that people 
are more likely to look to the example of others when those others are relevant than when 
they are not. Ingroup membership is an important criterion for self-relevance and can help to 
explain both “resilient” collective behaviours (such as social support) as well as less adaptive 
ones (such as ignoring fire alarms).  
                                                 
conclusion that diffusion of responsibility was the reason for non-response. Subsequent developments of their 
explanatory framework for bystander non-intervention concentrated on diffusion of responsibility through group 
size rather than social appraisal processes (see Levine & Manning, 2013, for a review). 
16 The following video of collective inaction in response to an alarm is well-known in fire safety training: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MtX-10c3fT0  
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FROM DISASTER TO PREVENTION 
The social identity model delineated here has implications for group processes not only in 
emergencies but also for potentially dangerous crowd events that risk becoming emergencies. 
In many mass gatherings the crowd is so large that those managing the event rely on 
cooperation and self-organisation within the crowd for a safe event. In these cases, the model 
described above would suggest that shared social identity would be the basis of behaviours 
and expectations within the crowd that can contribute to an experience of safety.  
A ‘near-disaster’ at Big Beach Boutique 2 
Big Beach Boutique 2 (BBB2), a free dance music event held on Brighton beach in 2002, was 
one of the incidents examined in our comparative design study (Drury et al., 2009a). We 
revisited it with a larger sample and multiple data sources to address a number of questions, 
one of which was why the event was not quite the disaster that some had feared (Drury, 
Novelli, & Stott, 2015). Certainly, it had the ingredients. First, the crowd was too large, both 
for the space allocated and for the number of safety and security personnel involved. The 
event organisers planned for a crowd of 65,000, but 250,000 people crammed onto the beach. 
Second, as a result there was an obvious strain on facilities, including the blockage of 
emergency exit routes. And third, some of the behaviour of the crowd appeared to be 
dangerous, including some people climbing up lighting rigs. Further, when the tide started to 
come in, there was a fear of crushing as people moved up the beach and a sizeable minority 
evacuated. Media and police sources described the event as a “near disaster” (e.g., McVeigh 
& Townsend, 2002). However, according to Brighton and Hove City Council’s Policy and 
Resources Committee, there were 150 minor injuries, and 15 people were taken to hospital, 
which does not seem especially high for a crowd event of this size.  
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We collected contemporaneous archive materials (including news reports, message board 
materials, and official documentation) and, some time after the event, carried out interviews 
with both attendees (n = 10) and crowd safety professionals (including stewards and police; n 
= 10). Qualitative analysis of this material suggested a positive atmosphere and widespread 
supportive behaviour in the crowd. We also ran a small questionnaire survey, again some 
time after the event. We used social media, word of mouth (since the event was a local one), 
and snowballing to recruit people who had attended the event (N = 48).17 Both qualitative and 
quantitative analyses suggested that perceptions of safety among the party-goers were strong. 
Analysis of the survey showed that social identification with the crowd predicted feeling safe 
directly, as well as indirectly through both expectations of support and trust in others in the 
crowd to deal with an emergency.  
Both crowd members and some of the crowd safety professionals stated that collective 
self-regulation and spontaneous self-organisation in the crowd, often based on dance culture 
norms, were crucial in preventing disaster. Examples included the orderliness of the 
evacuation, people forming circles round others to protect their privacy when urinating, 
helping people up who had fallen, and instances of managing drunken behaviour in others. 
Some of the crowd safety professionals also described how they worked with, not against, 
these crowd norms and values – for example using the DJ (rather than official authority 
figures) to persuade people to come down from the lighting rigs. 
How social identification moderates the effect of crowd density at the Hajj, Mecca 
Some of the limitations of the Big Beach Boutique 2 study – a small primary dataset and 
reliance on post-hoc interviews – were overcome in our study of crowd processes at the Hajj 
                                                 
17 The questionnaire respondents were a different sample from the interview study. In both samples, many of the 
respondents were people who regularly attended dance music events at the time of BBB2. 
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(Alnabulsi & Drury, 2014), which was undertaken as part of Hani Alnabulsi’s PhD research 
(Alnabulsi, 2015). Taking part in the annual Hajj or pilgrimage to Makkah18 in Saudi Arabia 
is one of the five pillars of Islam and so is expected of all able-bodied and financially solvent 
Muslims at least once in their lifetime. The official number of pilgrims who attended Hajj in 
2012, when the study took place, was over three million. The Hajj involves rituals at 
specified spiritual locations during a certain five-day period each year. Given the number of 
people seeking to be in the same locations at the same time, the density of the crowd is a 
potential threat to safety. Indeed, the Hajj event is most prominent in the news in the West 
when there is a fatal crowd crush among pilgrims. Thus, crowd density was one explanation 
for the disaster in 2006 when 346 pilgrims died as they attempted to “stone the devil” at 
Jamaraat Bridge (Helbing, Johansson, & Al-Abideen, 2007). 
Our study therefore focused on the relation between crowd density, shared social identity 
with the Hajj crowd, and reported safety among pilgrims. The study took place at the Al-
Masjid Al Haram, or Holy Mosque, in Makkah. The Holy Mosque contains the Ka’aba, a 
small black cube-shaped building which to Muslims is the holiest site on earth. During Hajj, 
pilgrims attend the Holy Mosque for daily prayers throughout their time in Makkah. At the 
beginning and end of the pilgrimage, they must also perform tawaf inside the Mosque, in 
which they circumambulate the Ka’aba seven times in an anti-clockwise direction. Using a 
team of research assistants who spoke different languages, we surveyed 1194 pilgrims as they 
assembled in and around the Holy Mosque. We sampled by the main language groups 
broadly in proportion to their representation at the Hajj: 420 (35%) were speakers of Arabic, 
150 (13%) of Malay, 150 (13%) of Urdu, 120 (10%) of French, 120 (10%) of Persian, 120 
(10%) of Turkish, and 114 (9%) of English.  Each research assistant was instructed to 
approach a quota of people who spoke his own language. The research assistants identified 
                                                 
18 The English spelling is Mecca. 
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language groups by mingling with the crowd, which allowed them to hear people’s voices 
and notice other cultural markers. 
The research assistants were trained to use the industry standard measure of crowd 
density (e.g., Still, 2014), which is to estimate from sight the number of people per square 
metre (ppm2) around each participant. The questionnaire measures for social identification 
with the crowd were constructed for this study based on our previous work and included 
items such as “I feel that I am part of this crowd” and “I feel at one with the people around 
me”. We took a number of other measures, similar to those used in the BBB2 study described 
above, including feeling safe (e.g., “I feel safe on the Hajj”) and perceived (or expected) 
support (e.g., “If I need help, other pilgrims would help me”).  
We reasoned that as levels of density increased in the crowd, this should be associated 
with a reduction in subjective feelings of safety. As expected, the relationship with safety was 
negative. However, we also expected, and found, this relationship to be moderated by 
identification with the crowd. Simple slopes analysis (see Figure 4) showed that, at relatively 
low levels of identification with the crowd, as density increased so safety decreased. 
However, at high levels of identification with the crowd, as density increased so safety 
actually increased. We reasoned that those who felt greater safety when the number of fellow 
pilgrims around them was greater were people who trusted these pilgrims to act with care and 
concern, and to support, protect and respect them. Thus, based on the social identity model, 
we predicted and found the same indirect effect of social identification on feeling safe via 
perceptions of support as found in Big Beach Boutique 2. 
--- Insert Figure 4 about here --- 
Of course, participants’ statements that they feel safe are not the same thing as objective 
measures of safety. Indeed, the feeling of safety in numbers might lead high-identification 
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individuals to gravitate to the densest areas of the crowd (Novelli, Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 
2013), increasing risk. Moreover, we should not expect a linear effect of increasing density 
on subjective safety for those high in identification with the crowd; at a certain level (> 
5ppm2), crowd density becomes dangerous. Above this level, people lose the ability to move 
independently (Fruin, 2002) let alone to be considerate or give support to others; and any 
minor collision can be amplified in a wave effect, leading to a fatal crowd crush (Still, 2014), 
Nevertheless, the key point to emerge from the Hajj study was an explanation for how an 
event that routinely reaches levels of density that most experts would regard as dangerous has 
involved relatively few fatalities over the years. As with Big Beach Boutique 2, the weight of 
the evidence strongly suggests that this has to do with the spontaneous orderliness of the 
crowd, based on a shared identity. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
There are many challenges in studying emergencies and disasters, and it seems likely that 
these challenges are among the reasons that the topic has been neglected in social 
psychology. Indeed, until recently, many of the pioneering developments in the field have 
been left to other disciplines, especially sociology. Difficulties of access affect the quality 
and quantity of data that can be gathered. Thus most studies of emergencies and disasters, 
like those described here, are not able to gather data in the immediate context of the event. 
We have made extensive use of post hoc interviews. These can provide powerful experiential 
accounts, but are likely to involve issues of social desirability and accountability, as well as 
memory (see Cocking & Drury, 2014). In some of our studies, the use of naturalistic 
secondary data, sometimes produced immediately after the event, helps to mitigate some of 
these negative features, although such data may not address topics of interest (such as shared 
social identity). Use of archival material is rare in social psychology; the consistency of data 
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is relatively low, but external validity can be relatively high, whereas our controlled studies 
(simulation experiments) were the opposite of this. 
Because of the unpredictability of most emergencies and disasters, few studies in the 
field employ a before-after design (a rare example is Wickes, Zahnow, Taylor, & Piquero’s, 
2015, impressive panel study of the effects of flooding). Therefore, like the studies described 
here, most research on collective behaviour in emergencies and disasters is essentially 
correlational. In the model and in the studies described in this review, we have treated shared 
social identity as prior to behaviour. But equally theoretically plausible are causal 
relationships from observed behaviour to social identification; other people’s behaviour in the 
interests of the group can tell us that we share social category membership with them; and 
behaving supportively towards others in a group can tell us that we are part of that group (cf. 
Bokszczanin, 2012). The notion of identity as outcome as well as cause of action is consistent 
with our findings in the collective action domain (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2000). 
Notwithstanding the design limitations that are inevitable in research on this topic, there 
are a number of issues that could fruitfully be addressed in relation to the theoretical account 
described here. One question is that of the factors that moderate social identity processes in 
emergencies and disasters. Some research suggests that people outside the event respond with 
less support to a human-made disaster than a natural one (Zagefka, Noor, Brown, de Moura, 
& Hopthrow, 2011); but how attribution interacts with level of self-categorisation among 
survivors themselves has not yet been examined. Another question concerns cross-cultural 
variations in responses. In collectivist countries (like Japan), there are chronically strong 
small group (family) ties, whereas in individualist countries (like the USA) such ties are 
weaker and therefore people in emergencies are perhaps more likely to demonstrate the 
contextual variability and flexibility of self-categorisation described by SCT and found in the 
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studies described in this review.19 However, this is not something that has been 
systematically examined.  
The issue of social identity as a strategic resource in emergencies and disasters is a 
further avenue for future research. This is an area in which some promising work has already 
begun. The argument here is that if shared social identity is the basis of adaptive behaviours 
in an emergency crowd, then those involved in actual or potential emergencies should 
actively seek to facilitate, strengthen, and promote shared social identity. This should be the 
case both for survivors and for those professional organisations working to respond to 
disasters.  
Carter’s work has demonstrated this principle of strategically mobilising a shared 
identity in the case of emergency responders in chemical, biological, radiological, and 
chemical (CBRN) incident mass decontamination (Carter, Drury, Amlôt, Rubin, & Williams, 
2013, 2014, 2015; Carter, Drury, Rubin, Williams, & Amlôt, 2015). Field survey, 
experimental visualisation, and quasi-experimental studies all showed that when responders’ 
communication was open, helpful, and respectful, this legitimised the responders’ actions and 
served to create shared social identification with responders themselves (cf. Stott, Adang, 
Livingstone, & Schreiber, 2008), as well as enhancing unity within the crowd around the 
norm of compliance with the procedure. The finding that these changed practices led to faster 
and more efficient decontamination in an emergency, where speed is of the essence, suggests 
that proactively creating shared social identity can help save lives.  
With regard to survivors themselves strategically promoting shared identity, Paton and 
Irons’s (2016) study of wildfires suggests that common fate may not have an automatic effect 
in creating unity and that people need to be motivated to talk to others about shared issues so 
                                                 
19 Thanks to Viv Vignoles for this point. 
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that they are seen as shared. The notion of talking a shared identity into being (cf. Postmes, 
Haslam & Swaab, 2005; Postmes, Baray, Halsam, Morton & Swaab, 2006), and the role of 
leaders (or identity entrepreneurs; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005) and organised groups 
in this process, may be particularly important in those kinds of disasters where there is an 
ongoing or repeated risk. It is well established that flooding can create a sense of community 
(e.g., Twigger-Ross et al., 2011); but in the months following a flood, this “altruistic 
community” may run out of both energy and resources (Kaniasty & Norris, 1999); and 
secondary stressors (Lock, Rubin, Murray, Rogers, Amlôt, & Williams, 2012) may become 
more salient as people try to get repairs made to their home. There is a need for shared social 
identity just at a time when the contextual affordances for such an identity may be 
diminished.  
Recent work by Ntontis on community response to the 2015-2016 floods in York has 
suggested how active community members try to promote shared social identity to facilitate 
emotional social support in the present and enhance collective preparedness for future floods. 
On the one hand, a cross-sectional survey found that common fate predicted shared social 
identity with those affected by the flood which in turn predicted expected support, collective 
efficacy, and support given – as in our earlier work on the Maule earthquake (Ntontis, Drury, 
Amlôt, Rubin, Williams, & Saavedra-Morales, 2017). On the other hand, an interview study 
carried out some months after the floods suggested that those affected by the floods used a 
range of criteria to define themselves as a group (e.g., not just common fate in relation to the 
flood but also shared experience of secondary stressors afterwards), and actively posited a 
group identity in various ways to keep the new community alive, including invoking a shared 
history and through organising meetings, Facebook groups, and commemorations (Ntontis, 
Drury, Amlôt, Rubin, & Williams, 2018).  
CONCLUSIONS 
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Over and above perceived danger and physical factors such as width of exits, group size, 
physical (in)ability to help (Aguirre et al., 1998; Chertkoff et al., 1996; Johnson, 1987), 
relationships with others in the crowd are a major determinant of what people do in an 
emergency. There are dangers in groups. The attempt to stay with others and act collectively 
may slow the individual down and even impede crowd flow; and some group norms can be 
dangerous. Yet, usually in these situations, groupness confers benefits and individualism 
increases risk. The more that everyone in a crowd acts as an individual, the more likely it is 
that exits will be blocked as people fail to coordinate (Mintz, 1951). In liberating us from the 
restrictions of individuality (Turner et al., 1987), shared social identity in a crowd can 
therefore be a crucial adaptive resource. Mass emergencies happen to crowds and in crowds. 
They can also create crowds. These crowds have in the past been seen as conduits of 
irrationality. Recent research suggests that, through sharing social identity, crowds do indeed 
act as conduits - for shared emotions, cognitions, and behaviours that can be described as 
forms of solidarity. In the context of an emergency, these solidarity behaviours can contribute 
to collective self-organisation and hence to safety, survival, and wellbeing. 
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